To Misha and Serezha, cordially
1. Introduction and summary. In this note, a code C in general means a set of words in a finite alphabet. Finite sequences of code words encode certain data, and mathematical problems related to codes depend on the class of situations in which encoding/decoding of the relevant data occurs. For the restricted purposes of this introduction, we will divide these situations and the relevant problems into three groups.
(i) Codes and encoding/decoding procedures in cryptography must efficiently work in those situations where there is a challenge of unauthorised access to and/or falsification of the encoded information, cf. [Ya00] .
In the relevant group of mathematical problems, encoding/decoding programs must be computationally easy, but the choice of the actually used program by a pair (or a larger group) of users must itself be encoded in such a way, that guessing it becomes computationally unfeasible for an unauthorised person/computer intervention.
Since the notion of computational feasibility itself became formalised in a highly non-trivial way, in these studies the P/NP problem is often invoked. 1
(ii) Error-correcting codes must be constructed in such a way that when the information encoded by a sequence of code words is transmitted through a noisy channel, decoding algorithms could reconstruct the initial text from its corrupted version, at least with high probability. M. Tsfasman and S. Vladut were among the pioneers of the creation and study of efficient algebraic geometric error-correcting codes and coauthored an influential monograph about them that exists now in several editions and translations, cf. [VlaNoTsfa07].
Interesting unsolved mathematical problems in the theory of error-correcting codes are stated in terms of properties of the set of all (unstructured or structured) codes of arbitrary length with a fixed cardinality of the alphabet. The study of mutually contradictory requirements of high transmission speed, high probability of error-free correction, and computational feasibility of encoding/decoding procedures, led to the notions of asymptotic bound for codes and isolated codes (lying above the asymptotic bound): see [VlaNoTsfa07] . A recent progress is related with the understanding that if the Kolmogorov complexity of the code is considered as its energy, the standard models of statistical physics furnish an interpretation of the asymptotic bound as a phase transition curve: see [Ma11] and [MaMar12].
(iii) Finally, neural codes to which this short survey is dedicated are mathematical models suggested for the understanding how brain copes with multiple tasks of orienting and navigating in the world, cf.
[CuIt08], [CuItVCYo13] , [Yo14] , [GiIt14] , and references therein.
The starting point of discussion is the following remark: external stimuli, say the spatial environment in which an animal moves, is accessible for (or even created by) a scientist. However, the brain of the animal must be able to reconstruct, say, a map of this environment and the current position in it using only the action potentials (spikes) of the relevant cell groups.
The philosophy underlying construction of relevant mathematical models can be summarised as follows. In laboratory experiments designed to study brain functions it is found that stimuli are naturally divided into groups, and with each group a certain type of neural activity is associated.
In [CuIt08] and [Yo14] , it is postulated that a given type of stimuli can be modelled via a topological, or metric stimuli space X. Furthermore, brain reaction to a point in X is modelled by spiking activity of certain finite set of neurons N X .
For example, whenever a rat in laboratory is moving in a restricted space, with possible obstacles, X is a map of accessible territory, whereas regions in which the animal finds himself, are marked by specific activities of hippocampal place cells: these cells constitute elements of N X .
In an unrelated study ([MaGaJoGoAshFraFri00]) of licensed London taxi drivers who had to pass an intense two-year training for orientation in (the mental map of) London, it was found that the total mass of hippocampal place cells is considerably larger that in the control group. (The authors worked with data from the pre-GPS tracker's era). This study is a strong argument for the assumption that hippocampus carries orientation/navigation neural networks in humans as well as in rodents.
Simplifying and averaging observable spiking data obtained from neurons in N X at various points in X, the researchers ([CuIt08], [CuItVCYo13] , [Yo14] ) postulate the following structures.
(a) The stimuli space X is endowed with a certain covering {U i } by subsets called receptive fields.
(b) Possible patterns of spiking activities correspond to words belonging to the respective binary neural code. Each word in such code is a map w : N X → {0, 1} or equivalently, the subset w −1 (1) ⊂ N X consisting of neurons that fire at certain points of X whereas the remaining neurons are inactive.
(c) The correspondence between certain subsets of positions in the stimuli space and patterns of neural activity is given by the formula (1) below.
(d) During the period of time when an animal studies his territory, (an appropriate group of cells in) his brain generates the code reflecting a map of it. When this study evolves to the stage of active life in this territory, sequences of code words encode paths in the territory.
The main problem which is addressed in [CuIt08] and [Yo14] is this: what properties of X can be reconstructed if one knows only all occurring patterns of neuronal activities, that is mathematically, the binary code C := C X ⊂ {0, 1}
n ? Here and below we fix an X and number all neurons in N X by {1, . . . , n} in order to simplify notation.
It turns out, in particular, that under some additional restrictions upon X and {U i }, the total homotopy type of X can be inferred from the relevant code C. In particular, finite sequences of words in C may be used in order to model elements of the fundamental groupoid of X: accessible paths from one neighbourhood in X to another one. (Finding such paths of minimal length used to be a constant challenge for brains of taxi drivers.)
The suggestion that brain uses and somehow encodes the combinatorics of coverings (and more generally, diagrams in (poly)categories) was made already in [BrPo03] .
Plan of the paper. In the section 2, I explain basic geometric structures relating binary codes to topological objects that model stimuli spaces, and algebraicgeometric structures useful for description of codes themselves. The section 3 contains statements of results from [Yo14] showing how neural codes describe homotopy types of stimuli spaces. Finally in section 4, I discuss possible versions of this approach for psychological and semiotic studies of languages.
2. Binary codes and related geometric objects. Let now C be a binary code as above. Define the support of a code word w = (ε 1 , . . . , ε n ) as supp (w) := {i |ε i = 1} ⊂ {1, . . . , n}. The correspondence between C and set of all supports of words in C is a bijection, and we will sometimes identify C with the relevant subset of subsets in {1, . . . , n}.
The binary code C is called simplicial one if for each w ∈ C and each v ∈ {0, 1} n with supp (v) ⊂ supp (w), we have v ∈ C. Clearly, arbitrary binary code C is contained in the unique minimal simplicial code which we will denote C.
Following [Yo14] , we will consider three types of geometric objects related to binary codes.
(i) Simplicial set of a code. The set of (supports) of all words of a simplicial code C has the natural structure of a simplicial set (see e. g. [GeMa03], sec. I.2).
To be more precise, this set of code words defines a triangulated space ([GeMa03], sec I.1) but the difference between the two notions is inessential in our context.
We denote the respective topological space ∆(C).
If the code C is not simplicial, we put by definition ∆(C) := ∆(C).
(ii) Code of a covering. Let X be a set endowed with a finite family of subsets U := {U i | i = 1, . . . , n}. Define the binary code C(U) (of length n) of this family by the following condition ([Yo14], p. 9):
We will usually assume that
(iii) Algebraic geometric description of a binary code. Identify {0, 1} with F 2 : finite field with two elements. Consider {0, 1} n as the set of F 2 -points of coordinatized n-dimensional affine space over F 2 .
Any polynomial P ∈ F 2 [x 1 , . . . , x n ] determines a code C P : this code consists of all points of F n 2 at which P vanishes. Call P a reduced polynomial, if each monomial with non-zero coefficient in P is a product of pairwise distinct variables x i .
An easy count (see e. g. [Ma99] ) shows that the map P → C P determines a bijection between reduced polynomials and binary codes of length n. In other words, each code C consists of F 2 -points of a unique hypersurface determined by a reduced polynomial over F 2 . The total ideal of polynomials vanishing at all points of C P is generated by P and x 2 i − x i , i = 1, . . . , n. Such and similar representations of a binary code are used in [Yo14] in order to devise algorithms for extracting geometric information from neural codes related to stimuli spaces.
3. Encoding topology of receptive fields. Given a covering U : X = ∪U i as above, we can construct its nerve: the triangulated space N (U), whose vertices u i bijectively correspond to U i , whereas Notice that the contractibility assumption on U i 's in the orientation problems models the fact that visual field at any point of space is covered by the direct lines of vision in all directions.
Proposition. ([Yo14], p. 13.) With the same assumptions as above, N (U) can be canonically identified with the triangulated space ∆(C(U).
Therefore, the total homotopy type of X is encoded by C. A check of the statement N (U) = ∆(C(U)) is omitted in [Yo14] , but the author has kindly sent me an easy combinatorial argument. I will reproduce it here in order to register that it does not use any topological structure of X: we may simply assume that X is a set represented as a union of its subsets U i to which we apply definitions (1) and (2).
The inclusion ∆(C(U)) ⊂ N (U) follows from the fact that if σ ∈ ∆(C(U)), then there is w ∈ C(U) whose support contains σ, so that applying (1) to w we get (2).
Conversely, N (U ) ⊂ ∆(C(U)). In fact, consider σ ∈ N (U). Choose p ∈ ∩ i∈σ U i : it exists in view of (2). Put τ = {j ∈ {1, . . . , n} | p ∈ U j }. Then σ ⊂ τ and applying (1) we see that σ belongs to the simplicial completion of C(U) and hence σ ∈ ∆(C(U)).
Applying Proposition 3.2 to receptive fields, N. E. Youngs in addition assumes that the relevant stimuli space X forms a domain in d-dimensional real affine space, and that all non-empty intersections of U i are convex. This assumption is also motivated by the orientation experiments, mentioned in sec. 1 above. She shows then that additional properties of X can be extracted from C(U), in particular, a lower bound for the embedding dimension d and an information about "nonobvious" relations between U i of the form
, p. 15). Algorithms for extracting this information are given in terms of polynomial generators of the ideal in F 2 [x 1 , . . . , x n ] defining the code.
4. Neural codes, semiotics, and modes of mathematical thinking. A code, as we defined it in the Introduction, is an analog of dictionary in linguistics. It is the list of minimal units of a language. Whereas theory of, say, error-correcting codes does not invoke any a priori semantic notions, semantics of neural codes was our main preoccupation here. (Cf. similarly motivated discussion of genomics in [Ge93] and Svante Pääbo's diagnosis in his book "Neanderthal Man: In Search of Lost Genomes": "The dirty little secret of genomics is that we still know next to nothing about how a genome translates into the particularities of a living and breathing individual.") Furthermore, the main problem addressed in [CuIt08], [CuItVCYo13] , [Yo14] can be compared to the decompilation in computer science: translating a machine/assembly language code back into a higher level language code. In semiotic parlance this means that spiking activity plays the role of signifier whereas the nerve of the covering is the signified referring to a stimuli space, its covering, and individual positions in the stimuli space.
Below I suggest that (a fragment of) the mathematical language used in this description of the signifier of neural code might have a wider applicability. I will focus on the example of "semantic space", discussed in [Man08] , sec. 2. In most variations, one starts with the assumption that "the space of meanings" (say, of words in a language) is a certain set X. The next step consists in postulating additional structures (in Bourbaki's sense) on it.
(a) The most straightforward assumption is that meanings form subsets U i rather than points of X so that we can imagine them as a covering even before (or without) postulating a topology.
For example, P. Guiraud ([Gui68] ) suggests that subsets of meaning U i have a natural embedding into affine spaces R d , whose axes are marked by "semes". Each seme axis corresponds to a semantic opposition (in the structuralist paradigm), such as "animate/inanimate", so that a pure "yes/no" picture would provide only an embedding into {−1, +1} d or else {0, 1} d . However, a more realistic description of meanings would allow less localised positions on the seme's axes. Say, on the axis "animate/inanimate", what place should be assigned to viruses? (b) Discussing Zipf's Law, D. Manin in [Man08] postulates furthermore that X is endowed with a measure, and that U i are its measurable subsets. He uses this structure in order to provide a mechanism generating Zipf's Law.
On the other hand, in the generating model of Zipf's Law developed in [Ma13] the key role is played by the Kolmogorov complexity of the hypothetical neural encoding of the semantic space rather than any specific structure of this space itself. It is implicitly suggested that such encodings are combinatorial objects, exactly as in stimuli spaces encodings considered above. Therefore it would be extremely interesting to study neural encodings of human languages from the perspective of [CuIt08] and [CuItVCYo13] .
(c) My last remark concerns a noteworthy parallel development in contemporary foundations of mathematics: Voevodsky's "univalent foundations", cf. [HTT13] and a brief introduction in [PeWa12] . Roughly speaking, in this model "continuous" (homotopy type theory whose logical description involves simplicial sets, exactly as in the models of neural codes) belongs to the level of foundations, whereas "discrete" (set theory) is a superstructure. During the whole XXth century, from the times of Georg Cantor and Felix Hausdorff, these two modes of mathematical thinking were developing in the reverse order, from discrete to continuous: cf. Figure 3 on p. 10 of [PeWa12] .
This probably justifies the decompilation metaphor and the image of "Foundations as Superstructure" suggested in [Ma12] .
